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In

The

~upreme

<9ourt

of the

State of Utah
CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, a Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COJ\IMISSION OF
UTAH and .JUANITA LEWIS
.JOHNSON,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
Plaintiff has correctly stated the question which
divides the parties to this proceeding, namely:
Under the stipulated facts was the Industrial Commission of Utah justified in using the fonnula
D X 332 X .60
- - - - - or should it have used the formula

52
D X 300 X .60
- - - - - in arriving at weekly
52

compensation~

In plaintiff's brief it is contended that the word
"usual'' as used in R. S. U. 1933, 41-1-70, as
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amended by Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 193'1. during
the year immediately preceding the injury resulting in death is equivalent to average weekly days
per week. With that argument we take issue.
Plaintiff has set out in its brief the statutes which
are or may have a bearing on this controversy. We
are apparently agreed as to the meaning of all of
such statutes except
Section 41-1-70, R. S. U. 1933,
as amended by
Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1937.
wherein it is provided:
"The average weekly wage of the injured
person at the time of injury shall be taken
as the basis upon which to compute benefits. Employment shall mean pursuit in
the usual trade, business or profession of
the employer. Five and one-half or six
days employment shall mean pursuit in the
usual trade, business or profession, the
usual operation of which is six days or less
per week. Seven days shall mean pursuit
in the usual trade, business or profession,
the usual operation of which is seven days
per week.''
We are agreed the daily wage of Mr. Johnson at
the time of his fatal injury was Three and 80-100
($3.80) Dollars. It is also agreed that Mr. Johnson
was fatally injured in the course of his employment; that is, in the usual business operations of the
plaintiff. We divide on whether under the stipulated facts Mr. Johnson should be awarded compensation on the basis of the usual operation of
plaintiff's business at the time he was fatally injured on six days or less per week, or on the basis
of Revrn davs 11er 'veek. Plaintiff contends for the
•

l
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forn1er - defendants for the latter. 'l'he word
''usual" is defined in Webster's New International
Dictionary as 1neaning ''such as occurs in ordinary
practice or in the ordinary course of events; customary, ordinary, habitual, common.''
It appears fron1 the stipulation that at the time
Mr. Johnson was fatally injured and for forty days
immediately preceding that time the plaintiff operated its business seven days per week and that during the remainder of the year next preceding Mr.
Johnson ~s fatal injury plaintiff's business was
operated from five to six days per week. Thus the
number of days per week that the plaintiff was
operating had been increased about six weeks before the deceased received the injury resulting in
his death either because the business of the plaintiff justified a longer week of operation, or because,
as counsel for plaintiff contends, the business of
the plaintiff was seasonal and the fatal injury
occurred during the period when the operation of
plaintiff's business was at its peak.
In either event plaintiff's business, as the coinmission found and as the stipulation shows, was
being carried on seven days per week when Mr.
Johnson received the fatal injury. If plaintiff's
business is seasonal in the sense that during somE:
seasons of each year it is operated seven days per
week~ it may not be said that there is anything unusual about the plaintiff's busine~s being operated
seven days per week. In such case, on ihe contrar~..,
the op0~ation iR us11a1 for that seacon of the year.
Plaintiff's argument is based upon the premise that
the average time that plaintiff did operate its business during the year next preceding the date that
.Johnson was fatally in~ured is of controlling importance. There is no lang'l1age in the act wl1ich
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indicates that the average days per week that a
business operates during a year preceding an injury should be used as the basis ·for determining
what is the usual operation. The language used
in the act nowhere indicates that average days per
week during the preceding year shall constitute
the basis for determining average weekly wage. As
well say that the period of one month next preceding the time in question shall be the basis for determining what is the usual period of operation.
Suppose a business operates seven days per week
for only one month a year and is closed down during
the remainder of t~e year. It could not be successfully contended that the usual period of operation
of 'Such business is 4-52nds days per week and that
compensation should be awarded on such basis.
Also, if a business is operated only one week of
seven days during a given year, it may not be successfully maintained that a person who is injured
or killed during that week shall be entitled to compensation on the basis of 1-52nd of his actual weekly
wage during that ~eek. To take another example:
Suppose Mr. Johnson had been employed only a
week or two before he was fatally injured. If
plaintiff's contention is to prevail his compensation
would not be fixed by the weekly wage that he
actually received when injured but by the average
number of days per week that the pJaintiff had
been operating- its business during the preceding
year. There is no language in the act which justifies such conclusion.
Obviously the dependents of Mr. Johnson should
not and the law does not permit a reduction of the
compensation to which they are entitled because he
was employed for a long rather than a short period
of time before he was injured. The law ~as taken
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care of any controversy that n1ight otherwise arise
by providing that the \yeekly wag·e shall he used as

the basis and cOinpensation shall be detennined by
the number of days that the business was operated
during the week when the injury occurred.
The clear expression of the legislature does not
adinit of construction. There is no justification to
change that language by a resort to the average
weekly time that the plant operated during the year
immediately precedin.g the time he was injured. As
well take two or five years or one or six months.
There was nothi"P-g unusual about the length of time
that plaintiff's plant was op,erated during the week
that Mr. Johnson was injured, but on the contrary
the business was operated as usual for a period of
seven days per week auring that week and for six
week~ prior thereto.
The case of
~forrison-Merrill

Co. v. Industrial Commis.
sion, 81 Utah 363; 18 P. (2d) 295,
lends support to fedendants' contention.

rrhe award heretofore made by the defendant Industrial Commission of Utah should be sustained with
costs.
Respectfully submitted.

JOSEPH CHEZ,
Attorney General of Utah.

ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorney for Juanita Lewis
Johnson.
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